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TOWARDS A NEW META-THEORY FOR DESIGNING IS SECURITY TRAINING
APPROACHES

ABSTRACT

Employee non-compliance with information systems (IS) security policies is a key concern for
organisations. To tackle this problem, scholars have advanced several IS security training
approaches. Despite the fact that the importance of having effective training is understood by
scholars and practitioners, IS security training is largely a theoretically underdeveloped area. To
this end, we advance a meta-theory for IS security training, based on Hare’s theory of three levels
of thinking. It is a meta-theory because it suggests that IS security training has certain fundamental
characteristics which separate it from other forms of training, and it advances pedagogical
requirements for the design and evaluation of IS security training approaches. After sketching this
meta-theory, including four pedagogical requirements for IS security training approaches, we show
that no existing IS security training approach meets all of these requirements. To this end, we put
forth an IS security training approach which meets all these requirements.

For scholars, this study offers new theoretical insights into the fundamental characteristics of IS
security training; a set of principles for designing and evaluating IS security training approaches;
and an agenda for future research on IS security training. For practitioners designing and
implementing IS security training at organisations, this study offers principles for designing
effective IS security training approaches in practice.

Keywords: IS Security, Meta-Theory, Learning Paradigms, IS Security Training
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1. INTRODUCTION

Employees’ negligent behaviour towards information security policies is one of the biggest threats
to IS security: if users do not comply with IS security policies, security solutions lose their
usefulness (Kruger and Kearney, 2006). A common approach to improving employees’ IS security
behaviour is to motivate and persuade them to adhere to IS security procedures through IS security
training (Puhakainen, 2006). While the need for IS security training is widely agreed upon by
scholars and practitioners, previous research has noted that this area is largely theoretically
underdeveloped (Puhakainen, 2006). Against this backdrop, we advance a meta-theory of IS
security training approaches. This theory suggests that IS security training differs from other types
of training, a fact which needs to be understood before pedagogical principles for IS security
training can be selected. Our theory maintains, based on a review of paradigms of learning, that
there are four pedagogical requirements which any IS security training approach must meet. We
then review extant IS security training approaches, and conclude that no previous approach meets
all these requirements. Finally, we illustrate how an IS security training approach can meet these
requirements.

The results of this study are welcomed by both scholars and practitioners engaging in IS security
training. For scholars, this paper offers a new theoretical contribution, the meta-theory for IS
security training approaches, which not only provides new understanding of the fundamental
characteristics of IS security training and how it differs from other forms of training, but also
suggests new principles to design IS security training approaches, and offers an agenda for future
research. For practitioners, this study illustrates how to put our meta-theory to practical use by
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offering important insights into how to improve IS security training in practice through the new
theoretical framework.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows: At the beginning of the second section, a new metatheory for designing IS security training approaches is advanced, including four pedagogical
requirements for IS security training approaches. Extant IS security training approaches are then
reviewed in the light of these requirements with the result that no existing IS security training
approach meets these requirements. At the end of this section, we demonstrate how an IS security
training approach can meet these requirements. The third section outlines implications for practice
and research, and finally, the fourth section concludes the findings of the paper.

2. TOWARDS A NEW META-THEORY FOR DESIGNING IS SECURITY TRAINING
APPROACHES

Gregor (2006) distinguishes five theory types in IS research: (1) analysis, (2) explanation, (3)
prediction, (4) explanation and prediction, and (5) design and action. We argue that the ultimate
objective of IS security training (theory) is “design and action”, since its objective is goal-oriented.
That is, the aim of IS security training theory is to design effective training approaches “effective”
meaning that employees would comply with IS security policies. Like “design and action” types of
theories (see Gregor, 2006) in general, we postulate that IS security training approaches should
ultimately provide theoretically informed guidance on how to conduct effective IS security training
in practice.

With respect to the theory viewed in terms of design and action, Hare (1952, 1963, 1981) suggests
a meta-theory of three levels of thinking. This theory is prescriptive and descriptive. With regard to
the latter, it describes potential maturity levels in relation to how people form action-guiding or
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normative principles1. We apply Hare’s meta-theory to sketch the structure of our new meta-theory
for designing IS security training approaches (Figure 1).

Meta-level: The
nature, and
existentialistic
features of IS security
training

Critical thinking
level: The
pedagogical
requirements for IS
security training

Intuitive thinking
level: The practice of
IS security training
at organisations

Theoretical
background: Noncognitivism (Hare,
1963) and theory of
persuasion
(Stevenson1944)

Theoretical
background:
Paradigms of
learning and metaorientations of
curriculum design

Theoretical
background:
Experiential and
collaborative IS
security training

Meta-level
requirements

Critical-level
requirements

Overridable
guidelines

Figure 1. A framework for the meta-theory of designing IS security training approaches based on
Hare’s theory of three levels of thinking (1952; 1963; 1981).

In Figure 1, the meta-level refers to fundamental questions, such as “What is IS security training?”
and “How does IS security training differ from other types of training?” In turn, the intuitive
thinking level means the customary or conventional activities in practice. The critical thinking level,
lying between the meta- and intuitive thinking levels, is needed to test the validity of our
ordinary/customary actions, and form new guidance in novel situations when needed (Hare, 1981).
When applied to IS security training, Hare’s idea is that people at the intuitive level, apply their
learned principles to IS security training. These intuitive level principles are obtained, for example,
through education, upbringing, and personal experience. People who simply follow their intuitive

1

Hare’s theory of universal prescriptivism has also prescriptive dimension by introduction of a logical decision making
method, called “universalizability of moral judgement”. This method is not necessary for our purposes; hence we omit
the discussion of it from this study.
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level principles, without ever questioning these, reside at the conventional level throughout their
lives. To give an example, a practitioner engaging in IS security training, who uses the same
training method that his supervisor used for educating him, without ever questioning the validity of
these methods, stays at the level of intuitive thinking. However, when people critically ponder the
validity and effectiveness of their customary principles, they move to “Critical Level Thinking”.
Such moves may be prompted by feedback from other people, self-critique, feedback from learners,
or hints that the IS security training does not work as desired. At the critical level, people can form
new imperatives and ways of acting with respect to IS security training, which they then implement
at the level of intuitive thinking. This means that the principles at the practical level are overridable;
they can be modified, refined or omitted (see Hare 1981). Or in a case where two of our principles
are in conflict, we can override (follow) one. Next, we describe these levels of thinking, starting
from the meta-level.

2.1 Meta-level thinking: The nature and the existentialistic features of IS security training

Meta-level thinking encompasses issues such as the meaning of learning in the context of IS
security training, or the fundamental characteristic of IS security training. Issues at this level are
important because they help us to understand how IS security training differs from other types of
training. We argue that it differs because it has certain specific characteristics, namely its nature and
existentialistic features. These will be discussed next.

First, it is important to understand the nature of IS security training, and how it differs from other
types of training. Based on non-cognitivism (Hare, 1963) and theory of persuasion (Stevenson,
1944), we argue that the nature of IS security training is non-cognitive and persuasive. This is in
contrast with other types of training, such as university education, which is descriptive (hence,
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cognitive), provides scientific facts absolutely, and does not seek to influence learners’ attitudes and
behaviour in the manner of persuasive training. IS security training is persuasive and non-cognitive
because its procedures are norms, per se, which require more normative training approaches than
the learning of facts (Siponen, 2000). Another reason why IS security procedures are non-cognitive
is that they are created within an organisational context, and not necessarily based on scientific or
moral inquiry (as are the creation of facts and moral norms, respectively). Following noncognitivism as a philosophical doctrine, IS security procedures are utterances expressing
organisations’ non-cognitive attitudes towards how employees ought to behave in a secure manner.
The expressional side of IS security procedures resembles cognitivism at first sight, in that it seems
to have a true value, although it does not. This is the case since IS security procedures are incapable
of being objectively true or false; hence, they are non-cognitive because they do not describe any
factual feature. For example, “This computer is red” is a cognitive statement, for which a truth
value can be resolved through scientific scrutiny. But a security procedure such as “Do not share
your passwords with peers” is not a fact; it does not have an objective truth value.

Along with this persuasive and non-cognitive nature of IS security training, there are four
existentialistic features of IS security training: (1) an existence of security-sensitive organisational
assets; (2) threats towards them; and (3) different technical, social, organisational, and mechanisms
for protecting the assets of the organisation (protection mechanisms) (modified from Siponen et al.,
2006). Without the existence of these features, there is no need to have IS security training; hence,
the label of existentialistic features. For example, if there are no assets of value in the organisation,
or if there are no threats to the organisation, there is no need for IS security nor for IS security
training. The first feature, an existence of security-sensitive organisational assets, means that IS
security training should ensure that the employees understand these assets. If employees lack such
an understanding, the IS security training is meaningless and arbitrary from the viewpoint of the
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substance. The second feature means that there has to be a threat to these assets. Again, we argue
that IS security training needs to introduce the relevant threats to the employees in a pedagogically
meaningful manner. Finally, the third feature means that IS security training assumes that there are
mechanisms in place that are able to protect security-sensitive organisational assets from threats,
and that this training must be focused on achieving this objective. These three existentialistic
features set the fundamental direction (general aim) of IS security training , in order to create a
deeper understanding of the use of protection mechanisms to secure security-sensitive
organisational assets from threats.

In the most successful cases, changes in employees’

understanding regarding existentialistic features also results in changes in their information security
practices (Thomson et al., 2006).

From the discussion of the nature of the IS security training, and the existentialistic features, we
arrived at the following meta-level requirements:

First meta-level requirement for IS security training approaches: An IS security training approach
must be based on the understanding that the nature of IS security training is persuasive and noncognitive.

Second meta-level requirement for IS security training approaches: An IS security training
approach must focus on the existentialistic features of IS security training.

We now focus on the preferred pedagogical requirements to be used in order to meet these two
meta-level requirements for designing IS security training approaches.

2.2 Critical level thinking: Paradigms of learning and features of meta-orientations
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The critical level thinking in terms of Hare (1981) applied to this context, concerns the selection of
proper pedagogical principles for carrying out IS security training in practice. Given that this study
examines the preferred pedagogical principles for IS security training, it scrutinises paradigms of
learning — behaviourism, cognitivism, constructivism, and social constructivism (Hung, 2001) —
for finding the most appropriate paradigm for this context. In order to select the most suitable
paradigm of learning for IS security training, it is helpful to apply the concept of meta-orientations.
In terms of Hare (1981), these theories help us to determine the most appropriate critical level
requirements for IS security training approaches. Next, we illustrate this framework (learning
paradigms and meta-orientation), and derive from it four pedagogical requirements at the critical
level. We then analyse the extent to which the existing IS security training approaches meet these
pedagogical requirements.

Compared to the paradigms of learning, meta-orientations allow us to more concretely examine IS
security training approaches. Meta-orientations represent basic orientations to the curriculum, which
is any intentional interaction designed to facilitate learning, while imposing the meaning of
experiences and achieving educational goals (Miller and Seller, 1985; Cheung and Wong, 2002).
Paradigms of learning and meta-orientations are interrelated; paradigms of learning form a
theoretical basis for meta-orientations, which are used to analyse IS security training approaches.
Table 1 summarises the learning paradigms that are applied as theoretical frameworks and presents
the practical features of meta-orientations in order to analyse IS security training approaches.
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Table 1: Features of the meta-orientations of curriculum design (see Miller and Seller, 1985; Miller,
2001)
Transmission

Transaction

Transformation

Paradigm of
learning as a
psychological
context

Behaviourism

Cognitivism

Constructivism

Social
constructivism

General aims

Reception and
mastery of predefined contents as
objective knowledge

Development of
cognitive abilities
and problem
solving skills

Transformation of
predominant beliefs
and actions; personal
change

Transformation of
predominant beliefs
and actions;
communal change

Content

Subject-centred

Problem- or
process-centred

Learner-centred

Community-centred

Teaching methods

Instructor-led
approaches in order
to transmit
knowledge and
provide external
reinforcement

Focuses on
cognitive problemsolving and
analysis

Focuses on critical
reflection of personal
knowledge through
collaboration or
authentic problem
solving to attain
personal change

Focuses on critical
reflection of
communal knowledge
through collaboration
or authentic problemsolving to attain
communal change

Evaluation of
learning

Observable
performance through
tests or competencebased evaluation

Adaptation of
knowledge and
acquisition of
intellectual skills

Conversational forms
of evaluation for
individuals

Conversational forms
of evaluation for
groups

Three meta-orientations are used to select the explicit psychological context of learning, and the
practical features of IS security training: content, teaching methods, and evaluation of learning.
General aims are used as a means for selecting the most appropriate paradigm of learning in IS
security training. The transmission meta-orientation resembles behaviourism, the transaction metaorientation is based on cognitivism, and the transformation meta-orientation has strong similarities
to constructivism and social constructivism. Thus, the paradigms of learning present the
psychological contexts of the meta-orientations.

The four paradigms of learning — behaviourism, cognitivism, constructivism, and social
constructivism — include specific directions and focus for educational practices. These four
paradigms represent the psychological context of meta-orientations by combining all the features of
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meta-orientations under a certain theoretical framework (see Table 1). The psychological context as
an explicit learning paradigm should be applied to the training approach, because learning
paradigms suggest fundamental directions and focus for educational practices, and thus are
invaluable for effective and pedagogically meaningful training (Yilmaz, 2008; McLeod, 2003).

In reference to Table 1, general statements of aims represent an overall direction for development of
the training approach. The content includes the subject matter, knowledge, skills, concepts, ideas, or
topic areas. The teaching method (instruction) stresses interactions aimed at enhancing learning
within the educational practices. Each meta-orientation also has a corresponding approach to
evaluation procedures.

General aim as a descriptive feature of IS security training

General aims of training (see Table 1) are used as a fundamental feature for selecting the most
appropriate paradigm of learning for IS security training. In transmission-oriented training, the
general aims are to convey certain pre-defined contents (objective knowledge, facts, skills,
concepts, and values) to students (Miller and Seller, 1985). A one-way flow of skills and knowledge
through reading or listening, without the opportunity to analyse or reflect on information, is an
example of transmission orientation (Miller, 2001). In turn, the general aims of transaction-oriented
training are to obtain problem-solving skills through inquiring, analysing, synthesising, evaluating,
or applying knowledge (Miller and Seller, 1985). This cognitive interaction emphasises analysis and
thinking rather than synthesis and feeling (Miller, 2001). Thus, the general aims of training are
clearly connected with the cognitive adaptation and application of knowledge — that is, of
cognitive problem-solving. Finally, Miller and Seller (1985) argue that in transformation-oriented
training, the general aims are expressed in relation to personal perceptions and experiences.
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Reflective skills and personal appropriations of the content are required to attain personal and social
(communal) change. According to this position, learning is aimed at transforming predominant
beliefs and actions.

In this study, the general aim of transformation-orientation with respect to communal change is
expected to be a fundamental feature of IS security training which sets the direction for other
features of meta-orientations: psychological context, content, teaching method, and evaluation of
learning (see Table 1). This expectation, with respect to the general aims, is based on meta-level
requirements for IS security training: non-cognitive and persuasive nature and existentialistic
features.

Recognising the persuasive and non-cognitive nature of IS security training (first meta-level
requirement for IS security training approaches) as for the general aims of IS security training, we
find that the transformation meta-orientation is the most suitable for IS security training. The
general aims of IS security training are not to simply make employees remember and understand
pre-determined contents (facts, concepts, or values) as general knowledge, in the manner of
educational practices in transmission-oriented training. Neither is IS security training aimed at
developing cognitive abilities, in the manner of educational practices in transaction-oriented
training. Rather, the ultimate purpose of IS security training is to improve expertise concerning
employees’ knowledge, attitudes, and behaviours that is applicable to IS security issues within the
organisation (Siponen, 2000). Therefore, learning is aimed at transforming predominant IS security
beliefs and actions in order for them to become a natural part of employees’ daily activities
(Thomson, et al., 2006).
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The existentialistic features of IS security training (second meta-level requirement for IS security
training approaches) are closely related to the IS security policies, because information security
policies are a common way of articulating these existentialistic features to the employees through
constraining and prescribing employees’ work behaviour (Thomson et al., 2006). In this paper, we
assume that in order to maintain a secure work environment, these existentialistic features, and thus
also information security policies, must be understood, accepted, and implemented collectively –
not only individually (see Salomon & Perkins, 1998). This social aspect of learning emphasises
organisations’ or teams’ level of acquisition of knowledge, understanding, skills, different cultures
(Salomon and Perkins, 1998; Brown and Campione, 1994), organisational routines that include
policies, practices, and belief systems (Levitt and March, 1988), or agreements that deal with
operating procedures (Weick, 1979) as a target of learning. This is a relevant perspective in the area
of IS security training because the general aims of training are closely tied to shared organisational
work practices and related work communities, and an organisation’s security culture is thereby
developed (Dhillon, 2007; Thomson et al., 2006). For this reason, general aims regarding communal
changes need to be emphasised. Organisational context, teams as learning units, and organisational
routines (existentialistic features as IS security policies) as a target of learning, are considered to be
communal characters of IS security training. These characteristics explain the reasons for selecting
the proper nature of the general aim of IS security training.

Pedagogical requirements for IS security training

Based on the general aim of IS security training, we argue in the following sections that, in order to
create communal change in the organisational context, the transformation meta-orientation and
consequently, social constructivism, is the preferred theoretical basis for IS security training. As a
consequence, it is necessary to emphasise social (or communal) viewpoints in regards to
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psychological context, content, teaching methods, and evaluation of learning in order to enhance
communal change in understanding existentialistic features of IS security training, Next, the
meaning of these four features of meta-orientation in transmission, transaction, and transformation
is explained. Also, pedagogical requirements for IS security training at the critical level derived
from transformation orientation, are put forward as a part of a meta-theory for designing IS security
training.

First pedagogical requirement for IS security training: Psychological context

The transmission meta-orientation represents mechanistic and natural science-based thinking, as
well as behaviouristic psychology (Thorndike, 1911; Skinner, 1968) (see Miller and Seller, 1985).
Thus, behaviourism is a psychological context in educational practices belonging to the
transmission orientation. In turn, the transaction meta-orientation is psychologically oriented to
developmental and cognitive psychology (Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972; Piaget, 196) (see Miller and
Seller, 1985). Thus, cognitivism as an approach to learning that emphasises individual development
of cognition, is the corresponding psychological context in transaction-oriented educational
practices. Finally, the transformation meta-orientation can be traced back to humanistic psychology
(Maslow, 1970; Rogers, 1969) (see Miller and Seller, 1985). The humanistic approach to learning
has much in common with the constructivist approach, as both emphasise the active role of the
learner and the interactive and communal character of learning. Humanism emphasises selfactualisation and self-transcendence (Miller and Seller, 1985), or growth and personal integrity
(McNeil, 1981). In turn, constructivism is a more appropriate learning paradigm from which to
construct meanings of events and ideas, to transform understandings (Ross, 2002), and to build a
connection between a learner’s existing knowledge and what he is expected to learn (Gagnon and
Collay, 2006). Instead of considering learning as an individual process, social constructivism
emphasises a social (or communal) viewpoint in the learning process (Palincsar, 1998). Thus,
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constructivism and social constructivism are corresponding psychological contexts within the
transformation orientation.

Constructivism and social constructivism have different theoretical origins. Constructivism is
rooted in Piaget’s (1985) socio-cognitive conflict theory, which explains the role of social
interaction in the learning process from the viewpoint of individual learning (Palincsar, 1998). In
turn, social constructivism is grounded on Vygotsky’s (1978) socio-cultural theory, which considers
individual thinking to be secondary to, and a derivative of, social interaction, and learning is
considered to require interaction, negotiation, and collaboration. Social constructivism stresses the
social viewpoint of learning processes, interactions, and knowledge. With respect to the descriptive
features of IS security training, we argue that social constructivism is the most suitable learning
paradigm. Thus, as a first pedagogical requirement for IS security training approaches, the explicit
psychological context — that is, the learning paradigm behind the training approach — must be
based upon a group-oriented theoretical approach to teaching and learning, which will guide
training activities (see Fardanesh, 2006; Gibson, 2001; Hinsz et al., 1997).

Second pedagogical requirement for IS security training: Content

In the transmission orientation, knowledge (content) is seen to be objective, unrelated to human
subjectivity (Brody, 1998), and static (Miller, 2001). Thus, transmission orientation focuses on predetermined subjects (Miller and Seller, 1985) and is the dominant orientation in basic skill
development and within traditional subject curriculums (Miller, 2001). The content of transmissionoriented training is subject-centred (Miller and Seller, 1985; Miller, 2001).
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Transaction orientation emphasises problem-centred content mainly selected by the teacher, but also
takes into account students’ interests (Miller and Seller, 1985). In addition, this cognitive process
orientation stresses the learning process and cognitive process skills rather than curriculum content
and the acquisition of factual knowledge (Cheung and Wong, 2000). Thus, the content is also
process-centred.

Concerning the scope of the content (or topic areas), transformation-oriented training stresses
learners’ experiences and involvement in the community, and is, therefore, considered to be learnercentred (Miller and Seller, 1985). New knowledge emerges from the community through
collaborative knowledge building (Hmelo-Silver and Barrows, 2008). Thus, the content can also be
community-centred. As with transaction orientation, the content is not separable from the teaching
methods and is mainly formulated during the educational practice.

IS security policies and employee compliance within an organisation as a content of IS security
training, are both dependent on environmental and communal factors, such as the prevailing
organisational policies, the aims of the company, and the individual learner (see Cole and
Engeström, 1993). In addition, they are influenced by the individual learner’s roles, perspectives,
values, and tacit beliefs (see Salomon and Perkins, 1998). Thus, in order to make the content of IS
security training understood, accepted, and implemented collectively (not just individually), it must
consist of employees’ shared knowledge, attitudes, and behaviours concerning IS security issues in
relation to its expected outcomes. Thus, as a second pedagogical requirement for IS security
training, the content of the training must be based on the collective experiences and meaning
perspectives of the learners (see Hmelo-Silver and Barrows, 2008).
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Third pedagogical requirement for IS security training: teaching method

In transmission-oriented training, a teaching method is the educator’s approach to spreading
knowledge. Thus, the teacher’s role is directive, and learners are passive participants (Miller, 2001).
Teaching shapes the learner’s responses through instructional procedures, such as modeling and
reinforcement (Palincsar, 1998).

Training resembles a transaction when teaching methods focus on cognitive problem-solving
through applications, analyses, and syntheses of the learning material (Bloom, 1956; Miller and
Seller, 1985). In these cases, training includes cognitive problem-solving activities that are mainly
defined by the teacher, and which demand active information processing from the learners.

According to Miller and Seller (1985), transformation-oriented teaching methods, in contrast, make
connections between students and the real world, while making students aware of their thinking
processes. Thus, they maintain that learning occurs through the critical reflection of information
through authentic problem-solving or communication. In critical reflection, a person or a group
ponders the validity of his actions, thoughts, and feelings in order to change these meaning
perspectives (Mezirow, 1991).

In the context of IS security training, teaching methods that create communal experiences must be
executed through discussions concerning experiences, attitudes, and behaviours towards security
issues. The communal creation of experiences includes collaboration (which must engage each
member of the group) in order to collectively solve the common problem or reach an agreement
(Dillenbourg et al., 1996; Rochelle and Teacley, 1995). In this sense, differentiating personal
teaching methods from communal ones is closely related to the general aims of training. For
example, a discussion to support individual understanding can be considered a personal teaching
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method. However, if the goal of the discussion is to reflect on collective experiences and to achieve
mutual understanding and agreements, it can be considered a communal teaching method.
Accordingly, as a third pedagogical requirement for IS security training, teaching methods must
focus on collaborative learning in order to reveal and produce collective knowledge (see Mezirow,
1991; Palincsar, 1998; Dillenbourg et al., 1996; Rochelle and Teacley, 1995).

Fourth pedagogical requirement for IS security training: Evaluation of learning

In transmission-oriented training, the evaluation concentrates on the learner’s observable
performance or achievement through tests (Miller and Seller, 1985). Generally, evaluation pursues
an objective measurement of training goals with pre-defined responses. Examples of evaluation
representing the transmission orientation in the context of IS security training are formal exams,
tests, or competence-based evaluations in authentic situations typically conducted after a training
session.

In transaction-oriented training, evaluation stresses the adaptation of knowledge, development of
intellectual skills (e.g., analysis and synthesis), and “the ability to assess concepts, theories and
materials according to selected criteria” (Miller and Seller, 1985: 182; Bloom, 1956). Thus,
evaluation focuses on examining learners’ information processing through cognitive problemsolving tasks.

Evaluation in transformative training includes various conversational models, such as informal,
experimental, and open-ended forms of evaluation for individuals or groups (Miller and Seller,
1985). Students are active participants who share responsibility in the evaluation process through
self-evaluation, reflection, collaboration, and continuous dialogue with the teacher, and evaluation
methods include feedback during work or assignments, group projects, peer evaluations, and
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interviews (Birenbaum, 1996). When the goal of transformative training is to construct
collaborative knowledge (in other words, to mutually understand new ideas and behavioural norms),
evaluation must measure the presence, frequency, and quality of group interactions in discourse
processes (Derry and DuRussel, 2000). Thus, as a fourth pedagogical requirement for IS security
training, evaluation of learning should emphasise experiential and communication-based methods
from the viewpoint of the learning community (see Miller and Seller, 1985; Birenbaum, 1996).

Existing IS security training approaches and the four pedagogical requirements

Existing IS security training approaches (N = 32) selected for the review include training and
awareness activities in an organisational context. The goal of such training is to achieve
organisation- and work-specific changes in employees’ attitudes and behaviours. Hence, studies on
education for information security professionals are outside the scope of this review (e.g., Goel &
Pon 2006, Bishop 2000, Romney et al. 2004, Ryan 2003, and Sharma & Sefchek 2007). Also
articles concentrating on the evaluation of training approaches (e.g., Kruger & Kearney 2006,
Martins & Eloff 2001, Stanton et al. 2005, and Dodge et al. 2007) are omitted because they focus
only on how to measure the effectiveness of these approaches, not the actual development and
implementation of training. In addition, articles referring to training as a part of an IS security
awareness programme are excluded if the characteristics of these training efforts are not described
in detail (e.g., Bray 2002, Information Security Forum 2005, Leach 2003, Murray 1991, Olnes
1994, Parker 1999, Sasse et al. 2001, Spurling 1995, Stacey 1996, and Telders 1991).

Table 2 shows the extent to which the extant IS security training approaches meet the four
pedagogical requirements formulated in this section. To summarise, none of the IS security
approaches meets all four pedagogical requirements. “X” means that an IS security training
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approach fulfils the requirement, and “–” signifies that it does not fulfil it (For more details, see
Appendix 1).

Table 2. The degree to which extant IS security training approaches meet the four pedagogical
requirements for IS security training approaches.
IS security training
approaches

(1) Fulfils the
requirement for
the explicit
psychological
context

(2) Fulfils the
requirement for
the content

(3) Fulfils the
requirement for
teaching method

(4) Fulfils the
requirement for
evaluation of
learning

Cognitive processing
approach (Puhakainen,
2006)

-

x

x

x

Social psychological
recommendations
approach (Kabay, 2002)

-

x

x

-

Andragogical approach
(Herold, 2005)

-

-

-

x

Strategic approach
(Wilson and Hash, 2003)

-

-

-

x

Pedagogical requirements: (1) the explicit psychological context must be based upon the group-oriented theoretical
approach of teaching and learning; (2) the content of training must be based on collective experiences of the learners;
(3) teaching methods must focus on collaborative learning in order to reveal and produce collective knowledge; and
(4) evaluation of learning should emphasise experiential and communication-based methods from the viewpoint of the
learning community.
Analysed IS security training approaches, which do not fulfil any of the pedagogical requirements: Constructive
instruction approach (Heikka, 2008); Constructive scenario approach (Biros, 2004); Cyber security game approach
(Cone et al., 2007); Pedagogical game approach (Greitzer et al., 2007); Social psychology oriented approach (Thomson
and von Solms, 1998); Motivation theory directive approach (Roper et al., 2006); Persuasive technology approach
(Forget et al., 2007); Normative approach (Siponen, 2000); Counteractive approach (McIlwraith, 2006); Security
ensuring approach (Peltier, 2000); Communication-oriented approach (Desman, 2002); Promotional approach (Rudolph
et al., 2002); Stakeholder approach, (Kovacich and Halibozek, 2003); Deterrence approach, (Straub and Welke, 1998);
Academic environment approach (Kajava and Siponen, 1997); University environment approach (McCoy and
Thurmond Fowler, 2004); Preventive approach (Nosworthy, 2000); Competence approach (Wilson et al., 1998);
Operational controls approach (NIST, 1996); ISD approach (Hansche, 2001); Traditional e-learning approach (Kajava
et al., 2003); Hypermedia instruction approach (Shawn et al., 1998); Policy creation approach (Gaunt, 1998);
Healthcare environment approach (Furnell et al., 1997); Discursive approach and online tutorial approach (Cox et al.,
2001); Briefing approach (Markey, 1989); Social engineering preventive approach (Mitnick and Simon, 2002) and;
Active e-learning approach (Furnell et al., 2002).

One study (Puhakainen, 2006) meets the last three requirements; another (Kabay, 2002) meets the
second and third requirements; and two (Herold, 2005; Wilson and Hash, 2003) meet the last
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requirement. However, features of existing IS security training approaches which fulfil these
pedagogical requirements, are not guided by the social constructivist learning paradigm or
instructional design approach. Therefore, they are considered to be only single features and not in
the essence of the IS security training practice. This means that instead of an active communal
production of knowledge and work practices, IS security training is directed towards adopting stable
work practices (see Tuomi-Gröhn and Engeström 2003). Given that no existing IS security training
approaches meet all four pedagogical requirements, the following section advances a new training
approach which meets these four requirements.

2.3 Intuitive level thinking: Example of an IS security training approach meeting the four
pedagogical requirements
In previous sections, we advanced a meta-theory for IS security training approaches, mirroring
Hare’s theory of three levels of thinking. Accordingly, we put forth two meta-level requirements (1.
An IS security training approach must be based on the understanding that the nature of IS security
training is persuasive and non-cognitive; 2. An IS security training approach must focus on the
existentialistic features of IS security training). These two requirements informed the search for
pedagogical requirements at the critical thinking level. As a result, four pedagogical requirements
for IS security training approaches were laid down. This section demonstrates a potential
pedagogical approach to IS security training, which meets these four pedagogical requirements.

Searching for a Proper Instructional Design Approach fulfilling the pedagogical requirements
for IS security training

The first pedagogical requirement for IS security training argued that the explicit psychological
context of IS security training must be based upon the group-oriented theoretical approach to
teaching and learning. In seeking such candidate approaches that meet the first pedagogical
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requirement for IS security training, constructivist instructional design theories are found to
constitute ideal theoretical bases for designing IS security training. This is due to two reasons. First,
a constructivist instructional design theory is beneficial in training design because it expresses
concrete instructions for training, unlike the four high-level pedagogical requirements derived from
the social constructivist learning paradigm2 (Yilmaz, 2008; Wasson, 1996). Second, constructivist
instructional design approaches are also relevant for social constructivist instructional design. The
key difference between them is that constructivism has a viewpoint of the individual learner and
social constructivism emphasises a social viewpoint towards learning with respect to general aims,
content, teaching methods, and evaluation (see Table 1).

Of the alternative constructivist instructional design approaches (see Fardanesh, 2006; Kirschner et
al., 2006), experiential learning is preferred here, because it is considered to be the prevailing
paradigm in adult education (Fenwick, 2001) and the preferred learning approach in the
organisational context (Pavlica et al., 1998; Backström, 2004; Dixon, 1999). Furthermore, it has
also been a successful learning approach aimed at attitudinal changes in other contexts, such as
group consciousness-raising, community action, social change (Weil and McGill, 1989), and workbased learning (Honey and Mumford, 1992). Thus, we also deem the experiential learning approach
to be a preferred approach for changing employees’ IS security attitudes and behaviours.

A leading experiential learning approach is the theory of experiential learning by Kolb (1984). It
acts as a foundation for modern experiential education and provides an effective framework for
planning teaching and learning activities (Tennant, 1997). Hence, we select it to form the
instructional design part of the IS security training approach (that should meet the four pedagogical

2

This is the case since the four pedagogical requirements at the critical level were meta-requirements, i.e., high-level
requirements for IS security training approaches.
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requirements). Because Kolb’s theory of experiential learning does not address the social aspects of
learning (Pavlica et al., 1998; Holman et al., 1997), we add collaborative learning techniques
(Barkley et al., 2005) to our IS security training approach, in order to achieve effective learning in
groups. Collaborative learning techniques are detailed practical descriptions that create effective
group work assignments and engage students in collaborative learning when knowledge is socially
produced and constructed by talking together and reaching agreements (Barkley et al., 2005).
Collaborative learning has been reported to be effective, for example, for conceptual change
(Rochelle, 1992), promoting achievement and productivity (Johnson et al., 1981), and improving
attitudes towards the subject matter (Springer et al., 1999). Next, the IS security training approach,
combining experiential learning and collaborative learning techniques, is introduced.

The Experiential and Collaborative IS Security Training Approach

A learning process is a four-stage cycle (Kolb, 1984). According to Gibson (2001), Kolb’s phases
of (individual) learning are analogous to phases of collective cognition: accumulation, interaction,
examination, and accommodation (see Figure 2). Each of these phases includes certain processes to
create changes in collective thinking and to develop effective group decisions and actions.
Information processing at the group level in cognitive tasks (such as problem-solving, decision
making, and inference) involves sharing information among group members, which creates learning
outcomes at both the individual and group levels (Hinsz, 1997). These four phases of experiential
learning can be seen as an example of the intuitive thinking level of the meta-theory for designing
IS security training approaches.

Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-53

23

Figure 2. The experiential learning cycle and analogous phases of collective cognition (Kolb, 1984;
Gibson, 2001).

Complemented by collaborative learning techniques (Barkley, 2005), the theory of experiential
learning offers an instructional design approach analogous to collective cognition, which refers to
the processing of information in groups (Gibson, 2001; Hinsz et al., 1997). Such a training approach
stresses the experiences and collective activities of learners in order to achieve communal change. It
resembles features of transformation orientation and of social constructivism (previously presented
in this article). Thus, this training approach fulfils the first pedagogical requirement for IS security
training: the explicit psychological context of IS security training must be based upon the grouporiented theoretical approach to teaching and learning.

While the experiential and collaborative IS security training emphasises the reflection of a common
competence as a content of training (see Backström, 2004), this framework also fulfils the second
pedagogical requirement for IS security training: the content of training must be based on the
collective experiences of the learners. In addition, while teaching method and evaluation are based
on a collective activity, interactions among individual learners (see Backström, 2004), this
framework also fulfils the third and fourth pedagogical requirements for IS security training:
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teaching methods must focus on collaborative learning in order to reveal and produce collective
knowledge, and evaluation of learning should emphasise experiential and communication-based
methods from the viewpoint of the learning community.

As argued in this section, the selection of the experiential and collaborative theoretical approach for
IS security training fulfils the first pedagogical requirement for IS security training. Next, each of
the four phases of experiential learning (see Figure 2) is described in the context of IS security
training in order to demonstrate in more detail, how the experiential and collaborative IS security
training approach meets the other three pedagogical requirements for IS security training.

Involve Learners’ Concrete Experiences

The learning cycle begins with concrete experiences (Kolb, 1984; Gibson, 2001), which form the
basis for learning. In IS security training, the concrete experiences at the initial phase of learning are
former experiences that the learner has encountered (see Fenwick, 2001; Dixon, 1999) with respect
to the existentialistic features of IS security training — security-sensitive organisational assets,
threats towards them, and protection mechanisms. Let us presume that an organisation finds
insecure email use by employees to be a problem. In this case, the employees’ concrete experience
with the security-sensitive organisational assets (e.g., confidential documents), threats towards them
(e.g., email eavesdropping) and protection mechanisms (e.g., email encryption) in regards to secure
email use, will constitute the starting point for IS security training.

Individual learners’ concrete experiences create a basis for realising pedagogical requirements for
IS security training approaches in the following three phases, which include content based on the
collective experiences of learners, and teaching methods involving collaborative learning. The

Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-53

25

fourth phase also includes evaluation which emphasises experiential and communication-based
methods from the viewpoint of the learning community. During the following three phases of
experiential learning cycle, these individual concrete experiences will be modified as a result of
collaborative reflection with respect to the collective experiences concerning the existentialistic
features of IS security training.

Engage Reflective Observation

The second phase, reflective observation (or interaction), occurs via retrieving, exchanging, and
structuring groups’ shared experiences (Kolb, 1984; Gibson, 2001). Then, concrete experiences can
be reflected through group discussions in order to react to others’ perspectives and practices (Honey
and Mumford, 1992), and to map a causal relationship between their work practices and respective
organisational consequences (Pavlica et al., 1998). In collaborative activities, learners generate rich
descriptions and analyses through systematic and intentional conversations with others, which take
into account learners’ personal and interpersonal perspectives, former knowledge, and attitudes
(Pavlica et al., 1998).

In practice, in the context of IS security training, learners work in small groups to generate
interpersonal experiences regarding existentialistic features of IS security training, in order to define
their meanings and implications for the organisation. For instance, if the topic of the training is to
make employees’ use of email more secure, their task is to consider what kind of security-sensitive
emails requires protection, what protection mechanisms constitute secure email use in general,
which of these practices are valid in their own work and why, and what threats exist if these
protection mechanisms are not followed. Thus, while this phase implements collective experiences
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as a content of training, it also involves groups’ interpersonal perspectives towards the
existentialistic features of IS security training. Hence, it meets the second pedagogical requirement.

Reflective observation of these collective experiences can be accomplished, for example, through
the collaborative learning technique called Think-Pair-Share (Barkley et al., 2005), which is
implemented as follows. First, learners think of existentialistic features with respect to secure email
use individually, and then share their ideas with a partner to create a joint response. Next, pairs
share their ideas in a group of four to expand common viewpoints (Lyman, 1981). Finally, the
results are visually presented to the whole group by amalgamating them on the blackboard, a
method, which supports learners’ understanding of different aspects and enhances their ability to
build group consensus on the secure use of email. Hence, teaching methods are focused on
collaborative learning in the form of group discussions (i.e., Think-Pair-Share) in order to reveal
and produce collective knowledge. Hence, this phase meets the third pedagogical requirement for IS
security training: teaching methods must focus on collaborative learning in order to reveal and
produce collective knowledge.

Support Formation of Abstract Concepts and Generalisations

The third phase, the formation of abstract concepts and generalisations, involves processes of
negotiation, interpretation, and evaluation (Kolb, 1984; Gibson, 2001). In this phase, the meanings
of collective experiences are interpreted in the organisational context by comparing them to the
organisational viewpoints (Honey and Mumford, 1992), as stated in the organisation’s written
security policies. The instructor needs to introduce the organisation’s email policies, related
security-sensitive organisational assets, threats towards them, and protection mechanisms. Building
on the aforementioned exercises in the previous phase (à la Think-Pair-Share), the learners analyse
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the similarities and differences between group experiences and the presented organisational
viewpoint. This phase is an examination of the overlap between organisational regulations and
employees’ communal experiences. Some variations are possible in cases where existing policies
and instructions do not reconcile with actual work practices.

Similarly to the previous phase, this phase involves collective experiences as a content of training,
thereby fulfilling the second pedagogical requirement: the content of training must be based on the
collective experiences of the learners. It also involves collaborative learning in the form of group
discussion in order to reveal and produce collective knowledge; hence, it fulfils the third
pedagogical requirement: teaching methods must focus on collaborative learning in order to reveal
and produce collective knowledge. However, compared to the previous phase, collective
experiences are now expanded from group to organisational level involving reflection of the
organisation’s formal email policies.

Enable Active Experimentation

The last phase, active experimentation, refers to the integration of collective experiences in order to
reach decisions and actions (Kolb, 1984; Gibson, 2001). In this phase of mutual perspective taking,
employees’ experiences (which were previously described and analysed) are now used to develop
new organisational practices (Pavlica et al., 1998). To put this into the context of IS security
training, and to take secure use of email as an example, concrete email use instructions are
established in a manner that solves the original problem - insecure email use by employees - by
combining individual (first phase), interpersonal (second phase), and organisational (third phase)
viewpoints with respect to the existentialistic features of secure email use.
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The ultimate purpose of the fourth phase is to define how formal email policies and instructions are
actually experienced by employees, and how they can be applied by the learners. For example,
rules, exceptional situations, and concrete procedures involving secure use of email are defined for
all employees to follow. It is essential that learners receive this concrete training outcome in written
form. For example, the instructor can deliver written policies to learners with open spaces for
learners’ possible correctives, supplements, and/or corrections. This document can also function as
a ‘learning contract’, which supports the transfer of learned knowledge and attitudes of employees
(for example, to secure email practices) (Kirkpatrick, 2005; Knowles, 1986).

As part of the last phase to ensure effective collective learning, learners need to be able to test their
new understanding in practice (Backström, 2004). In addition to describing, analysing, and creating
organisational practices, learners are required to implement changes in their work (Pavlica et al.,
1998). In order to validate a new practice in an organisation, potential changes in the policies and
instruction must be accepted by management. Employees need to consciously observe their email
use practices, and must execute applicable changes based on what has been learned in training.
Finally, these new experiences are evaluated through group interviews, which are then used to
evaluate the effectiveness of the training from the learners’ perspective. If required, these new
experiences can function as a starting point for a second learning cycle (Dixon, 1999).

A function of this phase is to put together the collective experiences of the learners with respect to
existentialistic features in the area of secure use of email, which formed the content of the training
in the presented example. A ‘learning contract’ as a concrete form of this collective knowledge can
again be created through collaborative learning techniques (e.g., Think-Pair-Share). This fourth
phase of experiential learning cycle also meets the second and third requirements for IS security
training. At the same time, after employees have changed and observed their IS security practices
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with respect to the topic of the training (for example, email use), evaluation of learning is conducted
using the group interview. Then, the fourth pedagogical requirement for IS security training is also
fulfilled: evaluation of learning should emphasise experiential and communication-based methods
from the viewpoint of the learning community.

3. DISCUSSION

Based on Hare’s (1981) meta-theory of three level of thinking, a new meta-theory for designing
effective IS security training approaches was developed in this study. At the meta-level, this theory
advances fundamental features of IS security training (non-cognitive and persuasive nature, and
existentialistic features), and formulates respective meta-level requirements. At the critical thinking
level, based on these meta-level requirements and learning theories, four pedagogical requirements
for effective IS security training based on social constructivism were formulated. As none of the
existing IS security training approaches meets all four pedagogical requirements, we advanced a
new IS security training approach, the experiential and collaborative IS security training approach,
that meets these requirements and provides overridable guidelines for IS security training.

Based on our findings, we would like to highlight the following four avenues for further research on
IS security training: 1) the development and implementation of IS security training approaches that
meet the pedagogical requirements set in this study; 2) the execution of an empirical evaluation of
the impact of IS security training at different levels while emphasising changes in employees’ actual
work behaviour; 3) the use of the control group or pre-then-post research design, along with the preand post-research design, to reliably and accurately measure the impact of the training; and 4) the
measurement of the integrative complexity of thought in analysing the changes incited with regard
to IS security behaviour. Next, these are discussed in more detail.
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First, it has been argued in this paper that future research should develop IS security training
approaches that meet the four pedagogical requirements, which were further based on meta-level
requirements and the social constructivist learning paradigm. Such IS security training approaches
should be developed and tested for different training topics and contexts.

Second, the impact of such social constructivist IS security training should be empirically evaluated
in practice. It is expected that implementation of the four pedagogical requirements for IS security
training formulated in this article should improve learners’ understanding of security-sensitive
organisational assets, impending threats, and protection mechanisms. This proposition can be tested
through the execution of an empirical evaluation of the impact of IS security training. To this end,
Kirkpatrick’s (2005) four-level approach offers useful information for evaluating training
approaches and is widely applied in diverse areas and in different types of organisations. These four
levels represent a sequence of inter-related ways to evaluate training approaches, and consist of: 1)
reactions (user satisfaction); 2) learning (changes in attitudes, knowledge, or skills); 3) behaviour
(e.g., how learning is implemented in the organisation); and 4) results (e.g., decreased frequency of
accidents and improved productivity).

While the general aim of IS security training, as described in this study, is to achieve communal
changes in employees’ information security work practices, the focus of the evaluations is mainly
on the third (behavioural) level in terms of Kirkpatrick’s model. However, Kirkpatrick (2005) and
Robinson and Robinson (1989) claim that all levels of this model have relevance to the evaluation
of training and should be implemented. While IS security training can affect learners’ knowledge
and skills relating to the achievement of more secure work practices, changes in behaviour also
require support from the organisation’s management. Thus, if no changes in employees’ security
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behaviour (third level) are achieved, further examination can reveal whether this situation is due to
ineffective training at the first and second levels of evaluation, or problems with the organisational
environment (e.g., work climate or lack of rewards). In turn, IS security training results (e.g.,
decreased frequency of accidents and improved productivity) denote positive outcomes at all
previous levels, and such results are the ultimate reason for training in the first place.

An assessment of the impact of training at the second, third, and fourth levels of evaluation
(Kirkpatrick, 2005) requires a pre- and post-research design where learners’ work practices, mental
abilities, knowledge, skills, or the number of incidents in the organisation, are measured both before
and after IS security training, and compared in order to demonstrate possible changes therein
(Robinson and Robinson, 1989).The third implication for future research on IS security training
calls for a rigorous pre-then-post research design with a control group. A pre-then-post research
design would more accurately reveal real changes and training benefits as compared with the
conventional pre- and post- design (Mezoff, 1981; Howard, 1980). According to Robinson and
Robinson (1989) and Mezoff (1981), in the pre-then-post research design, in addition to pre- and
post-measurements being taken, participants would be asked immediately after training how they
judged their earlier behaviour. They maintain that the pre-then-post research design should correct
participants’ previously incorrect views because, after training, they are expected to clearly
understand the subject matter and the purpose of training.

Fourth, to evaluate the impact of IS security training, we also suggest the use of integrative
complexity. According to Suefeld et al. (1992), it measures the complexity of mental abilities in
terms of differentiation and integration, where differentiation refers to the perception of different
perspectives, and integration to the conceptual connections among differentiated perspectives (e.g.,
trade-offs between alternatives). They maintain that integrative complexity has been successfully
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applied in the past to investigate attitudinal changes and social perceptions, and to solve
organisational problems. It assumes that the level of thought complexity can be changed by
discussion, information gathering, or training (Myyry, 2002; Suefeld et al., 1992). Thus, it offers an
opportunity to determine whether IS security training increases the integrative complexity of
thoughts regarding IS security behaviour. As a result of IS security training, learners are expected to
analyse and solve information security-related problems in their work using more diverse
perspectives.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Employee non-compliance with IS security policies is considered to be one of the biggest threats to
IS security. To solve this problem, several training approaches have been introduced in the IS
security literature. Despite the recognised importance of having effective training, IS security
training is largely a theoretically underdeveloped area. To fill this gap in research, a new metatheory for designing IS security training approaches, based on Hare’s theory of three levels of
thinking, was put forward. This meta-theory suggests that IS security training differs from other
types of training, and needs to be understood before pedagogical principles for IS security training
can be selected. Also, the meta-theory proposed four pedagogical requirements, which any IS
security training approach must meet. The existing IS security training approaches were then
reviewed in the light of these four requirements. This review pointed out that no previous IS
security training approach meets all these requirements. Finally, we demonstrated how an IS
security training approach can meet these requirements.

The key contribution of the study was the introduction of the new meta-theory for IS security
training, including four pedagogical requirements for designing IS security training approaches. In
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addition, four avenues for future research were suggested. First, it was argued that future research
should study the design and implementation of IS security training, based on the presented metatheory for designing IS security training approaches. Second, there is a need to execute an empirical
evaluation of the impact of IS security training at four levels of evaluation, while particularly
emphasising changes in employees’ security behaviour. Third, the control group or pre-then-post
research designs, along with the pre- and post-research design could be used for the creation of
reliable and accurate measurements of the impact of IS security training. Fourth, the measurement
of the integrative complexity of thought could be useful in analysing changes in IS security
behaviour.
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APPENDIX 1
With respect to meta-orientations of curriculum design, the results review of IS security training
approaches are demonstrated in Tables 3 – 6. In Tables, the term inclusive means that such IS
security training approaches represent all the meta-orientations and corresponding learning
paradigms with respect to the handled feature of the meta-orientation. In turn, the term exclusive
indicates that those approaches contain only one kind of meta-orientation and corresponding
learning paradigm with respect to the handled feature of the meta-orientation.

The first pedagogical requirement for future IS security training is that the explicit psychological
context, the learning theory behind the training approach, must be based upon the group-oriented
theoretical approach of teaching and learning, which directs the training activities (Fardanesh 2006;
Gibson 2001; Hinsz et al. 1997). Only six of 32 IS security approaches apply any learning theories.
However, such theoretical foundation is invaluable for effective training (e.g., McLeod 2003).
These six approaches consider learning only from the viewpoint of an individual learner: one
approach is placed exclusively under the transaction orientation (cognitivism), and five approaches
are placed under the transformation orientation (constructivism). Because none of IS security
training approaches is based on social constructivist learning theory, IS security training approaches
are not effective and pedagogically meaningful educational practices in this sense (see Table 3).
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Table 3. The psychological context of learning in the existing IS security training approaches.
Psychological context of learning within the IS security approaches
Missing (26)
Social psychology oriented approach (Thomson & von Solms 1998), Motivation theory directive approach (Roper et
al. 2006), Social psychological recommendations approach (Kabay 2002), Normative approach (Siponen 2000),
Deterrence approach (Straub & Welke 1998), ISD approach (Hansche 2001b), Counteractive approach (McIlwraith
2006), University environment approach (McCoy & Thurnmond Fowler 2004), Security ensuring approach (Peltier
2000), Academic environment approach (Kajava & Siponen 1997), Communication oriented approach (Desman
2002), Promotional approach (Rudolph et al. 2002), Preventive approach (Nosworthy 2000), Stakeholder approach
(Kovacich & Halibozek 2003), Strategic approach (Wilson & Hash 2003), Competence approach (Wilson et al.
1998), Policy creation approach (Gaunt 1998), Healthcare environment approach (Furnell et al. 1997), Social
engineering preventive approach (Mitnick & Simon 2002), Discursive approach and online tutorial approach (Cox
et al. 2001), Briefing approach (Markey 1989), Operational controls approach (NIST 1996), Active e-learning
approach (Furnel et al. 2002), Traditional e-learning approach (Kajava et al. 2003), Persuasive technology
approach (Forget et al. 2007), Hypermedia instruction approach (Shaw et al. 2008)
Transmission

Transaction

Behaviourism (0)

Cognitivism

Transformation
(1)

Constructivism (5)

Social
constructivism (0)

Inclusive (0)
Exclusive (0)
-

Exclusive (1)
Cognitive processing
approach
(Puhakainen 2006)

Exclusive (5)
Constructive
instruction
approach
(Heikka 2008),
Constructive scenario approach
(Biros 2004),
Andragogical approach
(Herold 2005),
Cyber security game approach
(Cone et al. 2007)
Pedagogical game approach
(Greitzer et al. 2007)

Exclusive (0)
-

The second pedagogical requirement for future IS security training is that the content of training
must be community-centred, i.e., based on collective experiences and perspectives of the learners
(e.g., Kolb 1984; Gibson 2001), which is considered as a feature of effective IS security training. 24
of 32 IS security training approaches include subject-centred contents typical to behaviourism. In
these approaches, the content of training is presented without connections to learning processes,
problem solving, or experiences of the learners in the training situation. Further, 18 of the
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approaches include process- and/or problem-centred content of training, which is typical to the
transaction orientation and also cognitivism, which emphasizes integration of new knowledge with
existing knowledge structures or cognitive problem solving and analysis (e.g., Palincsar 1998, 347).
Process-centred contents take into account the cognitive processing of information (e.g., activation
of learners’ prior knowledge before a training session, engagement of analogies, case studies, or
stories). Problem-centred contents emphasize cognitive problem solving tasks (e.g., analysis and
synthesis) as a part of training. Finally, 23 approaches include learner-centred contents. In these
approaches, the content of training is partly created during a training session according to the
learners’ experiences and choices, which is typical to the transformation orientation and
constructivism. Only two of these twenty-three approaches also include community-centred
contents typical to social constructivism, which stresses communal knowledge formulated during
training: the communal relevance of the learning task (the cognitive processing approach of
Puhakainen (2006)) and the existing corporate culture, expectations, and social schemata (the social
psychological recommendation approach of Kabay (2002)). (See Table 4).
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Table 4. The content of training in the existing IS security training approaches (Continues on the
following page).
Content of training within the IS security training approaches
Transmission

Transaction

Transformation

Behaviourism
(24)

Cognitivism
(18)

Constructivism
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(23)

Social
(2)

constructivism

Inclusive (12)
Social psychology oriented approach (Thomson & von Solms 1998)
Motivation theory directive approach (Roper et al. 2006)
Social psychological recommendations approach (Kabay 2002)
Constructive scenario approach (Biros 2004)
Andragogical approach (Herold 2005)
ISD approach (Hansche 2001b)
Counteractive approach (McIlwraith 2006)
Security ensuring approach (Peltier 2000)
Competence approach (Wilson et al. 1998)
Discursive approach and online tutorial approach (Cox et al. 2001)
Social engineering preventive approach (Mitnick & Simon 2002)
Traditional e-learning approach (Kajava et al. 2003)
Exclusive (7)
Deterrence
approach
(Straub & Welke 1998)
Academic environment
focused
approach
(Kajava
&
Siponen
1997)
Stakeholder
approach
(Kovacich & Halibozek
2003)
University environment
approach
(McCoy & Thurmond
Fowler 2004)
Preventive
approach
(Nosworthy 2000)
Healthcare environment
approach (Furnell et al.
1997)
Briefing
approach
(Markey 1989)

Exclusive (0)

Exclusive (4)
Normative approach (Siponen 2000)
Policy creation approach (Gaunt
1998)
Cyber security game approach
(Cone et al. 2007)
Active e-learning approach (Furnell
et al. 2002)

Behaviourism + cognitivism (2)
Communication oriented approach
(Desman 2002)
Promotional approach (Rudolph et al. 2002)
Cognitivism + constructivism (4)
Cognitive processing approach (Puhakainen 2006)
Pedagogical game approach
(Greitzer et al. 2007)
Persuasive technology approach (Forget et al. 2007)
Hypermedia instruction approach
(Shawn et al. 2008)

Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-53

Exclusive (0)

49

Behaviourism +
constructivism (3)
Constructive instruction
approach
(Heikka
2008)
Operational
controls
approach (NIST 1996)
Strategic
approach
(Wilson & Hash 2003)

Behaviourism +
constructivism (3)
Constructive instruction approach
(Heikka 2008)
Operational controls approach
(NIST 1996)
Strategic approach (Wilson & Hash
2003)
Social constructivism (2)
Cognitive
processing
approach (Puhakainen
2006)
Social
psychological
recommendations
approach (Kabay 2002)

The third pedagogical requirement for future IS security training is that teaching methods need to
focus on critical reflection of collective knowledge and experiences through authentic problem
solving or communication, i.e., they must include collaborative learning techniques in order to
reveal and produce collective knowledge (e.g., Barkley et al. 2005), which are preferred for
effective IS security training. With respect to teaching methods, 24 approaches represent the
transmission orientation and behaviourism. These teaching/learning activities facilitate teachers to
transmit knowledge and learners to receive knowledge or external reinforcement of their behaviour.
Nine of 24 approaches employ transaction-oriented teaching methods. Teaching methods that
represent the transaction orientation and cognitivism support the cognitive processing of
information, implement activities of cognitive problem solving and analysis, or both. Finally, 23
approaches include teaching methods that represent the transformation orientation and
constructivism. In these cases, teaching methods emphasize the opportunities to reflect on own
experiences, authentic problem-solving, or both. Along with individual activities, 14 approaches
representing the transformative teaching methods also include solitary references to the
collaborative learning activities in the learning situation, such as role-playing exercises and scenario
discussion (Thompson and von Solms 1998; Roper et al. 2006; Heikka 2008; Biros 2004; Siponen
2000; Herold 2005; McIlwraith 2006; Peltier 2000; Wilson et al. 1998; Gaunt 1998; Mitnick and
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Simon 2002; Cox et al. 2001; Greitzer et al. 2007; Kajava et al. 2003). However, the purpose of the
collaboration is to enhance individual learning, not to achieve socially constructed knowledge and
emphasize the communal character of learning. Therefore, teaching methods in these cases
represent constructivism. Only two approaches also include collaborative teaching methods that
emphasize the communal character of learning. These two are the cognitive processing approach of
Puhakainen (2006) that seeks the communal relevance of a learning task through a team rehearsal
and the social psychological recommendations approach of Kabay (2002) that tries to reveal
corporate culture and social views of the reality through discourse. (See Table 5.)
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Table 5. Teaching methods in the existing IS security training approaches (continues on the following
page).
Teaching method within the IS security training approaches
Transmission
Behaviourism

Transaction
(24)

Cognitivism

Transformation
(9)

Constructivism

(23)

Social
(2)

constructivism

Inclusive (8)
Motivation theory directed approach (Roper et al. 2006)
Andragogical approach (Herold 2005)
Counteractive approach (McIlwraith 2006)
ISD approach (Hansche 2001b)
Strategic approach (Wilson & Hash 2003)
Operational controls approach (NIST 1996)
Discursive approach and online tutorial approach (Cox et al. 2001)
Competence approach (Wilson et al. 1998)
Exclusive (8)
Deterrence approach
(Straub & Welke 1998)
Communication
oriented
approach (Desman 2002)
University
environment
approach
(McCoy
&
Thurmond Fowler 2004)
Preventive
approach
(Nosworthy
2000)
Stakeholder
approach
(Kovacich & Halibozek
2003)
Healthcare
environment
approach (Furnell et al.
1997)
Briefing approach (Markey
1989)
Promotional
approach
(Rudolph et al. 2002)

Exclusive (0)

Behaviourism + cognitivism (1)
Academic environment approach (Kajava & Siponen
1997)
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Exclusive (8)
Normative approach
(Siponen 2000)
Cognitive processing approach
(Puhakainen 2006)
Constructive
instruction
approach (Heikka 2008)
Policy creation approach
(Gaunt 1998)
Cyber security game approach
(Cone et al. 2007)
Pedagogical game approach
(Greitzer et al. 2007)
Active learning approach
(Furnell et al. 2002)
Hypermedia
instruction
approach (Shawn et al. 2008)

Exclusive (0)

52

Behaviourism +
constructivism (7)
Social
psychological
recommendations approach
(Kabay 2002)
Constructive
scenario
approach (Biros 2004)
Security ensuring approach
(Peltier 2000)
Social
engineering
preventive approach
(Mitnick & Simon 2002)
Persuasive
technology
approach (Forget et al.
2007)
Social psychology oriented
approach (Thomson & von
Solms 1998)
Traditional
e-learning
approach (Kajava et al.
2003)

Behaviourism +
constructivism (7)
Social
psychological
recommendations
approach
(Kabay 2002)
Constructive
scenario
approach (Biros 2004)
Security ensuring approach
(Peltier 2000)
Social engineering preventive
approach
(Mitnick & Simon 2002)
Persuasive
technology
approach (Forget et al. 2007)
Social psychology oriented
approach (Thomson & von
Solms 1998)
Traditional
e-learning
approach (Kajava et al. 2003)

Social constructivism (2)
Social
psychological
recommendations
approach (Kabay 2002)
Cognitive
processing
approach
(Puhakainen 2006)

The fourth pedagogical requirement for future IS security training is that informal, experimental,
and open-ended forms of evaluation for groups need to be applied. This means that assessment of
learning must emphasize experiential and communication based methods from the viewpoint of the
learning community (e.g., Derry and DuRussel 2000). Transmission-oriented evaluation practices
appear in 17 approaches. These evaluation practices include various ways to measure the repetition
of knowledge (e.g., multiple choice questions and security quizzes), or observe changes in a real or
simulated working environment without instant feedback (competence-based evaluation). These are
distinctive features of behaviourist evaluation practices. Typical evaluation of transaction and
cognitivism is performed in five approaches, where the object of evaluation is adaptation of learned
knowledge and problem solving through interactive exercises, case studies, or essay questions. In
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15 approaches, features of the transformation orientation and constructivism are identified in the
suggestions to conduct evaluation practices. Hence, these conversational evaluation practices are
characterised to be informal, experimental, and/ or open-ended. Typical evaluations include selfassessments, interviews, and feedback during the instruction. In addition, along with evaluation of
individual learners, three approaches stress communication as the purpose of evaluation, which is
viewed as a feature of effective educational practice: corrective feedback during the group
assignment (cognitive processing approach of Puhakainen (2006)), role-play scenarios and focus
groups (andragogical approach of Herold (2005)), and group interviews (strategic approach of
Wilson and Hash (2003)). (See Table 6.)

Table 6. Evaluation of learning in the existing IS security training approaches (Continues on the
following page).
Evaluation of learning within the IS security training approaches
Missing (10)
Social psychological recommendations approach (Kabay 2002), Normative approach (Siponen 2000), Deterrence
approach (Straub and Welke 1998), Academic environment approach (Kajava & Siponen 1997), University
environment approach (McCoy & Thurmond Fowler 2004), ISD approach (Hansche 2001b), Policy creation
approach (Gaunt 1998), Healthcare environment approach (Furnell et al. 1997), Discursive approach and online
tutorial approach (Cox et al. 2001), Briefing approach (Markey 1989)
Transmission

Transaction

Behaviourism (17)

Cognitivism

Transformation
(5)

Constructivism (15)

Social
constructivism (3)

Inclusive (2)
Competence approach (Wilson et al. 1998)
Hypermedia instruction approach (Shawn et al. 2008)
Exclusive (5)
Security ensuring approach
(Peltier 2000)
Communication
oriented
approach (Desman 2002)
Stakeholder
approach
(Kovacich & Halibozek 2003)
Social engineering preventive
approach
(Mitnick & Simon 2002)
Traditional
e-learning
approach (Kajava et al. 2003)

Exclusive (0)
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Exclusive (4)
Constructive
instruction
approach (Heikka 2008)
Cyber security game approach
(Cone et al. 2007)
Active e-learning approach
(Furnell et al. 2002)
Persuasive technology approach
(Forget et al. 2007)

Exclusive (0)
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Behaviourism + cognitivism (2)
Constructive scenario approach (Biros 2004)
Operational controls approach (NIST 1996)
Cognitivism + constructivism (1)
Pedagogical game approach
(Greitzer et al. 2007)
Behaviourism +
constructivism (8)
Social psychology oriented
approach (Thomson & von
Solms 1998)
Motivation theory directive
approach
(Roper et al. 2006)
Cognitive processing approach
(Puhakainen 2006)
Andragogical approach (Herold
2005) Counteractive approach
(McIlwraith 2006)
Promotional
approach
(Rudolph et al. 2002)
Preventive
approach
(Nosworthy 2000)
Strategic approach (Wilson &
Hash 2003)

Behaviourism +
constructivism (8)
Social
psychology
oriented
approach (Thomson & von
Solms 1998)
Motivation theory directive
approach (Roper et al. 2006)
Cognitive processing approach
(Puhakainen 2006)
Andragogical approach (Herold
2005)
Counteractive
approach
(McIlwraith 2006)
Promotional approach (Rudolph
et al. 2002)
Preventive
approach
(Nosworthy 2000)
Strategic approach (Wilson &
Hash 2003)

Social
constructivism (3)
Cognitive
processing
approach
(Puhakainen 2006)
Andragogical
approach (Herold
2005)
Strategic approach
(Wilson & Hash
2003)
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